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These are certainly critical and trying times for the
political economists. The science of political economy
is on trial, and the fate of its professors is being de-
cided. Will the verdict mean life or death,—inde-
pendent and fruitful existence, or complete disappear-
ance from the leaves of the book of future intellectual
activity? Will political economists find their occupa-
tion gone, or will their occupation acquire new im-
portance, value, and dignity? Before attempting to
predict the future we must glance at the remarkable
career of English political economy.
Shortly after the publication of Ricardo's volume,
De Quincey, certainly a keen and logical thinker,
wrote: "Mr. Ricardo had deduced a priori from the
understanding itself, laws which first gave a ray of
light into the unwieldy mass of materials, and had con-
structed what had been but a collection of tentative
discussion into a science of regular proportions, now
first standing on an eternal basis." To Colonel Tor-
rens it seemed perfectly certain that "twenty years
hence there will scarcely be a doubt respecting any
of the fundamental principles" of Ricardian political
economy. To understand and sympathise with this
optimistic view we need but to bear in mind that sci-
entific men believed it to be true that (as Cairnes ex-
pressed the claim subsequently) "the economist,
starting with a knowledge of ultimate causes," is "at
the outset of his enterprise at the position which a
physicist only attains after ages of laborious research.
"
Senior undoubtedly voiced the belief of most of his
predecessors and contemporaries when he proclaimed
political economy's independence of facts and enunci-
ated the proposition that the whole science, glorified
by Cobden as the highest study of the human mind, is
firmly built on four practically self-evident postulates.
In a word, it was then believed that there existed a
science of wealth whose laws, universal as well as im-
mutable, men had only to learn and obey,—a science
in whose names various theoretical and practical pro-
posals were dismissed with hasty and scornful con-
tempt as Utopian and unscientific. Nothing that ema-
nated from sources other than those recognised by the
economists, especially if it in anywise diverged from
some accepted economic principle, was considered
worthy of serious attention.
But does not all this appear like ancient history
when we turn to survey the present condition of eco-
nomic discussion? The word iA>£-;/ww/; is purposely
employed in lieu of science, since it is generally agreed
that there is really no such thing extant as a "science"
of political economy. "Young men ask," said Bage-
hot, in a lecture, "whether this [economic] science,
as it claims to be, will harmonise with what we now
know to be sciences, or bear to be tried, as we now try
sciences
; and they are not sure of the answer. . . .We
find the state of the science to be almost chaotic."
Arnold Toynbee bluntly declared that Ricardian polit-
ical economy " is at last rejected as an intellectual im-
posture," and Jevons reluctantly admitted that "the
public would be happier in their minds for a little time,
if political economy could be shown up as an impos-
ture." Professor Cairnes complained that only from
six to ten students attended his lectures, while in all
London no more than a hundred persons visited the
public economic schools. Professor Marshall confesses
that "economics is yet so much in its infancy that it
has but little to teach." And even that "little" is so
little respected by scientific men that in 1876 an active
attempt was made by the representatives of the pre-
liminary sciences in the British Association to excom-
municate the economists and abolish the Economic
Section as no better (to quote Mr. P. Geddes) than
a disgrace to a scientific association ; and this humilia-
tion was averted only by the economists choosing as
champions such men as Dr. Ingram, who, though os-
tensibly eager to save the reputation and independence
of their group, actually, (to quote the same writer,)
"unconditionally surrendered the citadel " and even
"took up arms on the side of the invaders."
The contrast between the past and the present of
political economy, the disparity between the early
promises and the actual achievements, will be con-
ceded to be sufficiently striking to justif}' the inquiries
that have been made into the causes of the radical
change. But it cannot be said that successful ex-
planations of the revolution have been furnished.
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Toynbee was certainly in error when he described it
as entirely the result of the " chill breath of intellectual
criticism," for we do not know of any such crushing
criticism; and the latter-day economists of the "his-
torical school" are no less mistaken when they attrib-
ute it to the discovery of the importance of supple-
menting and guiding deduction by induction, for this,
as Marshall avers, was well known before. Marshall's
own opinion is that the change is not chiefly attribut-
able to any particular attacks on economic doctrine,
but "is due to the discovery that man himself is in a
great measure a creature of circumstances and changes
with them." Ricardo and his followers, he thinks,
"regarded man as, so to speak, a fi.xed quantity, and
gave themselves little trouble to study his variations ";
whereas "in different ways Goethe, Hegel, Comte,
and other writers called attention to the development
of the inner character and outward institutions of man,
and worked their way towards the notion of tracing
and comparing the modes of growth of the different
sides of human nature." But the proper and satis-
factorj' answer seems to be that many influences, di-
rect as well as indirect, great as well as small, have
contributed to the effect. It is conducive to clearness
to recall in this connection the luminous observations
of Lecky in reference to the process by which popular
beliefs get driven out of circulation and are supplanted
by new ones radically different. Any complete change
in public opinion, according to his view, " may be the
result of a controversy which has conclusively settled
the question, establishing to the satisfaction of all par-
ties a clear preponderance of argument or fact in favor
of one opinion, and making that opinion a truism
which is accepted by all enlightened men." But "it
is possible also for it to be effected by what is called
the spirit of the age. The general intellectual ten-
dencies pervading the literature of a century pro-
foundly modify the character of the public mind.
They form a new tone and habit of thought. They
create new attractions and new antipathies, and they
eventually cause as absolute a rejection of certain old
opinions as could be produced by the most cogent and
definite arguments." In the case of political econ-
omy, while it is doubtless true that both of Lecky's
"classes of influences" were brought to bear, the
spirit of the age is nevertheless to be held responsible
as the chief factor. Special and definite parts of the
body of old economic doctrine were destroj'ed by di-
rect controversial attack. To the polemics of Cliffe
Leslie, Toynbee, Thorold Rogers, Thornton, Ruskin,
Carlj'le, and other writers we have to attribute the
fact that the Ricardian theory of rent, the Malthusian
population hypothesis, the wage-fund theory. Senior's
"four unchallengeable postulates," and rent there-
ward-of-abstinence theory, are now by common con-
sent relegated to the region of "unsettled problems";
while the profound and general distrust of political
economy as a whole we must acknowledge to be the
work of the spirit of the age. The theological and
philosophical doctrines which Smith and Malthus ex-
plicitly adopted and laid at the foundation of their
economic structure, and which Ricardo tacitly assumed,
could not fail to be thrown overboard, as utterly un-
founded, when the application of scientific methods to
sociological problems began to yield conclusions re-
specting social life and growth as irreconcilable with
the physiocratic assumptions borrowed by Adam Smith,
as is the theory of development with the notion of spe-
cial creations. The economist's plea for /aiss^z faire
necessarily came to be regarded as the result of an op-
timism no less innocent than Dr. Pangloss's conviction
that everything is for the best in this best of possible
worlds; and with the destruction of this corner-stone
was involved the total collapse of the old economic
system. The laisscz faire doctrine, Cairnes felt, had
brought disaster and disgrace to the science which
came to be regarded as "a handsome apology " for
the existing arrangements, and lie naturally favored
the relinquishment of the pernicious and fatal doctrine.
Bagehot, who had little faith in the socialistic
schemes which elicited sympathetic consideration from
Mill and Cairnes, sought to preserve at least the skel-
eton of the old system by limiting and qualifying it in
every direction. We were told, in the first place, that
political economists are not speaking of real men, but
of imaginary ones ; not of men as we see them, but of
men as it is convenient to us to suppose they are." In
the next place, the original claim to universality and
immutability was withdrawn, and the modest state-
ment made that English political economy "is the
theory of commerce." Finally, Bagehot cautioned us
against the suspicion that political economy aspires to
regulate practical affairs and solve real problems aris-
ing in the world of material interests. It only says
these and these forces produce these and these re-
sults, and there it stops.
Such a method could not succeed, however. To
say nothing of the obviously fatal objection that an
abstract political economy which guides no one and
aids no one in practical difficulties is worse than use-
less, it is evident that such an interpretation could not
check the advance of socialism, which professed to
deal with things as they ought to be and to show a
way out of the complications between capital and la-
bor. In fact, the rise of socialism is coincident with
the definitive rejection of laisscz faire as the corner-
stone of political economy. Unwilling to expose them-
selves to ridicule, the economists declined to defend
free competition, which they knew the founders of the
school rested on teleological assumptions, and enlisted
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in the army of their old-time antagonists, the social-
ists. It is no secret that the strength which socialism
has acquired lately, in and out of legislative councils,
is mainly derived from the patent tendency of modern
economists to assimilate and appropriate socialistic
doctrines. The economists do indeed hope to preserve
their independence; but the logic of events is against
them. The real and consistent alternative is the com-
munism of Mr. Bellamy, with equality of income and
total suppression of individuality. Under Mr. Bel-
lamy's system, exchange is superseded by common
ownership of products, free contract by enforced soli-
darity. The triumph of the principle, "To each ac-
cording to his needs, from each according to his ca-
pacities," implies the extinction of political economy.
But are there not among the economists wiser and
more perspicacious men who know how to avoid the
errors of the old school without embracing the blun-
ders of socialism ? Passing over the so-called empir-
ical school of economists, which has done nothing of
value, let us examine the proposals of the philosoph-
ical economists,—of men like Cliffe Leslie and Dr. J.
K. Ingram, who appear to suggest profitable measures
for the elevation of economics. They argue that po-
litical economy properly constitutes a branch of so-
ciology ; that its discoveries and principles, when ar-
rived at in accordance with scientific canons of research,
should be viewed as provisional and preparatory to the
development of truly universal sociological principles
;
and that, since men's various interests are interrelated,
political economy, which deals only with wealth, can-
not pretend to be capable of furnishing instruction re-
garding conduct in general, but merely of indicating
more or less probable tendencies. Political economy,
they hold, is not a separate science, but a branch of
social science. The "jargon" of natural harmony,
natural liberty, etc., they unhesitatingly reject, al-
though they are not prepared to advocate increased
interference of government in industrial relations. In
fact, while they discard theoretical /ai'sscz /aire, they
would have government practise laissez faire, because
they realise with Bacon that luciferous research must
come before fructiferous, and agree with Herbert Spen-
cer that methods that answer are preceded by thoughts
that are true. There being as yet an extreme want of
true thought and scientific ideas upon sociological sub-
jects, they deprecate haphazard legislation, and are
content with the work of spreading clear conceptions
and of urging upon all students the vast complexity of
social problems.
That this advice is sound and healthful as far as it
goes, cannot be denied. The theoretical position is
impregnable, and the practical suggestion both oppor-
tune and sensible. But there are some considerations
that Dr. Ingram overlooks. As Professor Marshall
sa^'s : " It is vain to speak of the higher authority of
a unified social science. No doubt if that existed,
economics would gladly find shelter under its wing.
But it does not exist. . . . There is no use in waiting
idlv for it ; we must do what we can with our present
resources." Were it possible to induce society and
legislatures to respect and accept present conditions
until the science of society should throw a flood of
light upon all our difficulties and make wise action
possible, then we should gratefully accept Dr. Ingram's
advice and "learn to wait." But society will not and
cannot wait. The masses clamor for state intervention
and regulation, and well-meaning reformers are ready
with all sorts of plans for eliminating social evil. Laws
are manufactured by the legislative mills without num-
ber, and their operation naturally produces important
changes in social relations. To remind us of ignorance,
is useful, but utterly inadequate. Moreover, it is far
from being true that, as Professor Marshall avers, so-
ciology "shows no signs of coming into existence,"
and that " the only resources we have for dealing with
social problems as a whole lie in the judgment of com-
mon sense." Nobody would claim that we have a com-
plete and strict science of society ; but it is emphat-
ically true that some truths have been established,
some generalisations formed, that not only afford the
illuminating principle essential to the proper interpre-
tation and classifications of facts, but permit the direc-
tion of practical affairs in approximately correct ways.
In political economy, no less than in other branches of
the sociological science, it is perfectly possible, not
only to carry on theoretical investigations in a scien-
tific manner, but to map out and guide more or less
safely our practical course by the light (dim as it is
compared with what we hope it may become) of those
large truths and important generalisations which so-
ciological authorities have placed at our disposal.
First, there is the law of justice, or the principle
of equal freedom, justly termed the first principle of
human happiness, which Mr. Spencer, the greatest of
our sociologists, has established and placed upon a
strictly scientific basis. It having been demonstrated
that the principle of equal- freedom has the highest
warrant imaginable and an authority transcending
every other, it becomes necessary to test existing eco-
nomic arrangements and current notions, and pro-
nounce upon them from the point of view of equal
freedom. It will scarcely be contended that justice
may be safely ignored or violated in the sphere of eco-
nomic interests ; hence the need for defining the na-
ture of just economic relations. It has also been estab-
lished by :Mr. Spencer and other sociologists that the
progress of society is from status to contract, from
compulsory cooperation to voluntary cooperation, from
a condition in which agreement results from authority
;594 THE OPEN COURT.
to a condition in which authority results from agree-
ment. It is further insisted that in the transition
state it is absohitel}' impossible to decide upon the
utilitarian merits of any measure or proposal save by
constant and intelligent reference to the ideal formed
of the future through the study of evolution and the
factors and agencies which prevail in the present. Now
what are the logical conclusions from these premises
with regard to political economy, which, we have seen,
is urged by the most competent thinkers to adopt the
philosophical method and conduct its investigations
in the light of modern sociological knowledge ? Polit-
ical economy has to deal with the problem of national
wealth and prosperity,—has to teach the true and
proper principles of production and distribution. But
facts need to be correctly understood ; they require
classification and systematic grouping,—which cannot
be accomplished except by the aid of a guiding prin-
ciple, a theory. Modern economists complain of the
lack of such a guiding principle. The physiocrats,
and their English disciples, had the principle of "nat-
ural liberty," the theory of laissez faire, which they
borrowed from the theology and philosophy of their
time. The fact that their principle was arbitrary and
unscientific, their doctrine vague and nebulous, and
that consequently their superstructure had to fall when
the philosophy was supplanted by one more positive
and true,—this fact does not at all militate against
their wisdom in basing their economic beliefs on those
principles. There is nothing surprising in the fact that
their economic beliefs were as untenable as their the-
ological, metaphysical, and philosophical notions. The
economists of cur day, therefore, must go to our so-
ciologists and philosophers for their criterion of eco-
nomic right, for guiding principles. And what have
the latter to impart ? This, briefly : that ideal eco-
nomic relations are perfectly free relations, that the
fundamental law of equal freedom negatives govern-
ment meddling and regulation of production, exchange,
and distribution, and that all economic teaching which
contemplates less than justice is necessarily u//-eco-
nomic as well as immoral, that is, conducive to social
misery and distress. And this is tantamount to de-
claring that once again /aissez faire must become the
corner- stone of economics. Back to the old formula,
whose meaning, however, is entirely new. Instead of
the "natural state" of the physiocrats, there is the
ideal state, which society is bound to reach if its nat-
ural progress is not violently obstructed, and which
evolution marks as the goal of our endeavor. The
state of nature was a fiction, natural harmony an ar-
bitrary assumption, but the ideal state is a strictly phil-
osophical conception. We must, as Mr. Spencer says,
keep an eye on the compass which tells us whereabout
the ideal lies, so that the changes we may make may
be towards it, and not away from it. Absolutism is
needed in economics as well as in ethics, and the lesson
to be impressed upon the minds of those who dtal
with temporary needs is that in industrial relations, no
less than in political and social relations, nothing can
be right and advantageous that checks or retards the
movement towards justice or equal freedom, and that
nothing can be wrong that wisely promotes that move-
ment.
Dr. Ingram, Professor Huxley, Thorold Rogers, in
criticising the modern laissez faire-\s,is,, do not betray
the faintest perception of the fact that Mr. Spencer's
reasons for advocating non-interference are totally dif-
ferent from those of the believers in a code of nature.
To speak, as does Professor Huxley of "a new Rous-
seauism, " (V /;-^/(7j- of this revival of laissez /aire doc-
trines, is to be guilty of a grave oversight. Modern
laissez faire-'ists have the support of science, not of
metaphysical assumptions ; in adopting the formula of
the metaphysical school, they only accept the conclu-
sion, reserving the right to find the logic for it. Hence
the arguments that put to flight the old believers in
laissez faire leave the moderns unmoved. Unaccount-
ably short-sighted is Dr. Ingram in thinking that Mr.
Spencer is simply the (as yet) unconverted champion
of an exploded doctrine, the last representative of an
extinct school of theorists ; and that his pleas and pro-
tests will be like a voice crying in the wilderness. The
truth is that Mr. Spencer was the first thinker to pro-
claim the necessity for a new departure in practical
politics and legislation, to correspond with the new
truths and generalisations of sociology. He was the
first to hold up the new ideal and to indicate the way
leading to its realisation. His comparative isolation
(which led some English politician to insinuate that
Mr. Spencer is against "all England ") is due to the
fact of his being the founder of a philosophical school,
the leader in a new movement, not to his being engaged
in perverse and futile attempts to maintain a lost cause.
It is safe to predict that Mr. Spencer will not go to
sue for peace at the hands of Dr. Ingram and his friends,
who doubt everything but doubt, and who have noth-
ing definite and positive to offer ; but that they will at
no remote day find themselves constrained to go to him.
A reconstruction of economics is declared to be ur-
gently needed by economists, and they are searching
for philosophical foundations. Mr. Spencer's "Jus-
tice " is respectfully recommended as supplying their
want.
THE ABSOLUTE.
The mischief which the term "absolute" has
caused in almost all the antiquated philosophies is
hardly imaginable. The absolute actually plays the
part of a fetish among a certain class of sages who re-
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quest their readers and adherents to bow down into
the dust and worship the absolute as soon as their
thinking capacity, either from innate inability or from
natural laziness, ceases to accomplish its purpose.
The absolute is an idol which is still worshipped
and which must be broken to make room for a purer,
clearer, and truer conception of philosophy.
We present the following definitions of the term ab-
solute*: (i) That which is not related. (2) That
which is not conditioned. (3) That which is entire,
complete, or perfect. (4) That which is viewed with-
out regard to its relations or conditions as a complete
whole.
The term "absolute" is used in contradistinction
to "relative." That which is not relative is absolute.
The most important relations being those which con-
dition the existence of a thing, the term came to be
identical with the unconditioned or that which has the
conditions of being in itself. This raised the dignity
of the word above all its comrades and it became a
substitute for God, for God alone can be described as
"unconditioned." Those philosophers, accordingly,
who have ceased to believe in God, but have not out-
grown the paganism of antediluvian religions, find it
very convenient to enthrone a divinity of their own
make and to treat it with the same awe and reverence
which marks the behavior of all fetish worshippers.
Let us review the philosophical meanings of the
term. Absolute is used in the sense of "that which
is not related." Very well! Such a thing as "that
which is not related " does not exist. The world is a
system of relations and there is nothing that is or can
be unrelated. Even the God of Genesis (i. e. accord-
ing to the traditional notion) is not an absolute being.
He stands in a definite relation to the world as its
creator, ruler, and master. The God of the New Tes-
tament being He in whom we live and move and have
our being can still less be called absolute ; and the
Universe as such, the All, the totality of being (whether
we include God as a part of it or regard the Universe
with materialists or atheists simply as a big lump of
material atoms) is as little absolute as either a super-
natural or an immanent God, for the All has certain
relations to its parts.
In one word, the absolute in the first sense is sim-
ply a humbug.
The " absolute " in the second sense, as that which
is not conditioned, is, perhaps, admissible, although it
would be an improper expression for that which ought
to be called the unconditioned. For the "uncondi-
tioned " or "that which has the conditions of its being
in itself " is not a concrete thing, a special being, or a
big person inside or outside of the world, but a certain
* The word is derived from the Latin absohitum, meaning that which has
been loosened from.
feature existing in all the realities to be met with in
experience. All things, all creatures, all concrete real-
ities or beings, as such, are forms ; they originate by
being shaped, they disappear by being dissolved, but
there is a certain something in them which abides in
all the changes, and this certain something is part and
parcel of their existence.
Here is not the place to discuss what this feature
of an abiding something in all the various forms of
being is. It is most certainly not only matter and
energy as the materialists say, it is also the elementary
something of that which in its highest evolution ap-
pears as consciousness and mainly that peculiarity of
the formal laws which establishes harmony and makes
them so axiom-like self-evident (as they have been
called) that through them the whole universe becomes
transparent like glass to the eyes of the initiated. In all
these abiding features of fleeting existences there abides
an inalienable consistency of being with itself which
gives to the world the character of Gcsctzmdssigkcit, so
that uniformities prevail which can be formulated in
so-called "natural laws," so that the totality of the
world is not a chaos but a cosmos, a whole in which
order prevails.
Something " unconditioned " in this sense exists in
the abiding features of the various existences. But it
is obvious that this something that abides is not abso-
lute ; it is not without relations to the other more or
less fleeting forms of realities. Moreover, we cannot
so much say that it is unconditioned as that it is con-
ditioning the very existence of every thing that is.
The absolute in the third sense is identical with the
All, including everything and anything, past, present,
and future, also all the chances of its possible forma-
tions. The All alone is a perfect entirety, a complete
whole in itself, which has no relations to things out-
side, because there are none, the All including every-
thing.
This conception of "absolute" is quite legitimate,
but the expression "All" being free from the mystical
tinge that still adheres to the term "absolute" is pre-
ferable. We can only use the term absolute in this
sense as an epitlicton ornans for the All in All, not as
its name ; yet as an epitJu-ton ornans it has little sig-
nificance.
The "absolute" in the fourth sense expresses, not
a quality of or in things, but a certain attitude of the
thinking subject. In this sense, it has a loose and
rather popular application. Thus we speak of the "ab-
solute certainty" of mathematics, meaning thereby
simply its universal reliability*; there may be special
cases, but there are no exceptions to mathematical
* Mathematical axioms possess absolute certainty in the sense mentioned
above; they are reliable statements. But they are not absolute truths, i. e.,
truths which need not be proved.
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theorems. We speak of "absolute monarchy," looking
at monarchy abstractly and meaning thereb}' that ac-
cording to the law of the country the monarch is not
bound to give account to any one for the acts of his
rule or misrule. We speak of "absolute (i. e., the
highest imaginable) perfection," of "absolute (i. e.,
perfect) beauty," "absolute (i. e., pure) alcohol," " ab-
solute zero " of temperature, which is
—
459.4". All
these terms and many more similar phrases are sanc-
tioned by usage, but nowhere is there any really abso-
lute as a quality of things ; there is only a relative ab-
soluteness, a lack of relations in some special direc-
tions or a perfection or finish of some kind.
Thus the usage of the term "absolute" in these
and similar connections is not to be understood in any
strict or philosophical sense of the word, but is a license
quite allowable for special purposes.
It would lead us too far here to refer to all the non-
sense that has been written by those philosophers who
seriously declare that " philosophy is ultimately, by its
very nature, a search for the Absolute " (with a capi-
tal A).
No greater absurdity has been excogitated by a
great man than the idea of things in themselves, which
really means "things absolute." (See Tlie Monist,
Vol. II, No. 2, "Are There Things in Themselves ? ")
Hegel's system has been characterised as the philoso-
phy of the absolute. He maintains, as Flemming sums
it up, that "all existence is strictly a manifestation of
the Absolute in the evolution of Being, according to
dialectic." The truth is that all existence is existence,
and the idea of absolute existence is nothing but a pale
thought, an abstract symbol created by dialectic to rep-
resent those qualities which all existences possess in
common. To represent the absolute, this shadow of
being, as real, and existence as a mere manifestation
of it, is turning the universe topsyturvy. p. c.
TRUTH.
Truth is correct knowledge, i. e. , a statement of
facts that is perfectly reliable. In other words : Truth
is the agreement of a representation with the object
represented.
No objection can be made to Thomas Aquinas
when he defines truth as "adaquaiio intcUcctus et rei,"
which, in more modern form, means "conformity of
thought to thing." Intellectus or thought is the men-
tal symbol, the idea, the conception of something, and
'es is the reality represented in the mental symbol of
an idea, it is the object thought of.
Truth, accordingly, is the adequateness of a rela-
tion, to-wit, of a mental relation. Without mind no
truth. Truth does not dwell in non- mental facts. It
is a misnomer to speak of objects or objective facts as
being true. Facts are real, while the facts represented,
i. e., statements of fact, if correct, are true.
A single sense impression is a fact, but the percep-
tion of a sense-impression as a certain object is either
true or untrue. Facts are real, or, if they do not ex-
ist, unreal; ideas are true or untrue.
There is a great difference between truth and real-
ity. The facts of reality are always single, concrete,
and individual. Every fact is a liic and nunc. It is in
a special place, and it is as it is, at a certain time. All
facts are definite and of a particular kind. Yet truth,
although representing facts, i. e., objects, or relations
among objects, is never a concrete object, nor is it a hie
or a nunc. It rises above facts, and views facts from a
higher standpoint.
The simplest truths are statements as to the real-
ity of facts; they are declarations that a certain thing,
or event, or relation, does or did or will, does not or
did not or will not, obtain. Higher truths are the
statements of natural laws, describing certain regulari-
ties of facts in general formulas. Truth accompanies
mind in its growth ; and the higher a mind rises, of
the more consequence will be the truth or untruth of
its ideas.
The kinship of truth with mind endows truth with
a generality that is lacking in the particularity of the
single facts.
We cannot speak of the truth of mere sensations.
The sense-organs furnish us with facts ; they present
certain data ; and if our sense-organs perform their
work with sufficient regularity, they furnish under the
same conditions the same sensations. Properly speak-
ing, we cannot say that there is truth in these sensa-
tions ; these sensations are as yet non mental realities.
Yet when sensations are recognised as representing
certain objects, i. e., when they become perceptions,
they acquire the power of being either true or untrue.
Perceptions are elementary judgments ; they are the
first mental functions, and from them the mind rises
into existence. Should it happen that a sensation is
registered in a wrong place, it will be mistaken; it will
cause errors. Thus truth originates together with
mind. Truth and error are the privilege of mind.
The development of mind means the development
of truth. Sentient beings observe in a certain group
of facts, in spite of all variety, some features of same-
ness. Such features are noted by brutes, then named
by man, and finally, in the scientific phase, they are
expressed in exact formulas. These formulas are called
natural laws. If a natural law describes all the cases
precisely and exhaustively, we call it a truth.
Truth in one sense is objective ; it represents ob-
jects or their relations conceived in their objectivity,
in their independence of the subject. This means that
the representation of certain objective states will, un-
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der like conditions, agree with the experience of all
subjects— i. e., of all feeling beings having the same
channels of information.
Truth in another sense is subjective. Truth exists
in thinking subjects only. Truth affirms that certain
subjective representations of the objective world can
be relied upon, that they are deduced from facts and
agree with facts. Based upon past experience, they
can be used as guides for future experience. If there
were no subjective beings, no feeling and comprehend-
ing minds, there would be no truth. Facts in them-
selves, whether they are or are not represented in the
mind of a feeling and thinking subject, are real, yet
representations alone, supposing they agree with facts,
are true.
We distinguish between true and real. We have
further to distinguish between true and correct. Purely
formal statements, such as 5 X 5 = 25, have no direct,
but only indirect reference to objects. They are empty
forms which have to be filled with contents from the
realm of our experience. General usage agrees in de-
noting such statements of purely formal construction,
if made with strict consistency, according to the rules of
our mental operations, not as "true," but as correct.
The very name of truth has something holy about
it, and rightly so ! For if the All-existence in which we
live and move and have our being is God, truth, viz.,
the representation of this All-existence, is God's reve-
lation. Christian mythology calls God our father, and
the word of truth, or the Logos, his only begotten
son. It is the mission of Christianitj' to found an
empire of truth, the kingdom of heaven upon earth,
and this empire of truth which is within us (i. e., in
the souls of men) must be acquired by our own efforts,
or as Christ says : The kingdom of heaven suffers vio-
lence whenever men are eagerly searching for the
truth.*
Considering the relation between mind and truth,
it is natural that mind vcarns for trutli. The yearn-
ing for truth constitutes the deepest impulses of the
mind. It cannot be otherwise, for truth is the Jtilfil-
7ncnt of mind. Truth, however, is not only a correct
representation of facts as they are now and here, but
also as, according to conditions which constitute a
given state of things, they must be here and every-
where. Mind expands in the measure that it contains
and reflects the eternity and universality of truth.
The criterion of truth is the perfect agreement of
all facts, of all interpretations and explanations of facts
among themselves. If two facts (such as we conceive
them) do not agree with each other, we must revise
them ; and it may be stated, as a matter of experience,
* We read in Matthew ii, 12 ; "And from the days of John the Baptist un-
til now the kingdom of heaven suftereth violence, and the violent take it by
force," which means that e&orts are made to realise it.
that our mind will find no peace until a monistic con-
ception is reached. A monistic conception is the per-
fect agreement of all facts in a methodical system, so
that the same law is recognised to prevail in all in-
stances, and the most different events are conceived
as acting under different conditions yet in accord with
the same law. p. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
Picking up my morning paper of March 8th, I was greatly
shocked and overcome to find that the returns for only one day
showed bribery hard at work helping and hindering legislation in
Indiana, Nebraska, and Kansas. Revelations of the same char-
acter from other states are promised in the reports for to-morrow,
and we mourn the decay of public morals ; but sad as the prospect
is we are not altogether without hope. In an age of legislative
corruption it is cheering to see the General Assembly of Illinois,
superior to the venal temper of the time, wrapped in its Roman
toga, going into quarantine against temptation as against cholera,
and defying the tempter to bring on his gold,—and plenty of it. A
few days ago a bill appeared in the Legislature granting another
ten thousand dollars to the World's Fair, and by a queer coinci-
dence every member received in a letter that morning a ticket or
"pass" giving him the freedom of the Exposition until the 30th
day of April 1893, a somewhat ironical privilege, considering that
the Fair will not be opened until the first of May. The temptation
was bravely spurned in a "ringing" preamble and resolution
which, reciting the facts declared them to be "an attempt to im-
properly influence the honorable members of this General .Assem-
bly." This, while rather paradoxical was virtuously proud, but
the next paragraph is more high-spirited still, and it condemns with
senatorial dignity the cheapness of the "pass" offered in return
for a grant of ten thousand dollars. Thus manfully rings the pre-
amble, "Whereas, if any honorable gentleman were inclined to
be thus influenced it is worthy of note that those passes all expire
April 30th, the day previous to the opening of the Exposition."
This appeal to civic honor, suggesting also the danger of low
prices, was followed by a resolution declaring "that all members
should virtuously and promptly return the passes to-day received."
Since the celebrated attempt to bribe the Iowa Legislature with
apples, the cheapest offer made for an " honorable member" is a
pass to the World's Columbian Circus, good until the day before
the opening of the show. It ought to be "virtuously " returned.
Had the tickets been good until the close of the Exposition, they
might, like the railroad passes and some others, have been "vir-
tuously " retained.
The attempt to make the Joliet Penitentiary sectarian is meet-
ing with much indignant opposition, and the Governor of the State
is called upon to interfere in behalf of all denominations. The
complaint is that religion in the penitentiary is under the control
of a trust composed exclusively of Lutherans and Roman Catho-
lics ; that the convicts must get spiritual food from those denom-
inations or go hungry altogether ; and that as the state at large
must pay for the food the discrimination is unfair. A settlement
of the trouble is not easy because we have no moral standard by
which to measure a practice alien to the constitution of the state,
the appointment of chaplains for public institutions. Where a
state religion is unlawful a state chaplain ought to be unlawful
too ; but if we must have the luxury of a chaplain for the peniten-
tiary, or the legislature, or the insane asylum, the constitution
being broken in his appointment, what matters it in which religious
direction the lines of the fracture go ? What matters it whether
the chaplain of the penitentiary be Catholic, Lutheran, Methodist,
or Jew, except as the convicts themselves may have an interest in
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the question ; and in that case, they ought to be allowed to decide
what faith should or should not be preached in the penitentiary.
It may be that the religious views of the convicts have been con-
sulted in the selection of chaplains, and if so, that ought to be
satisfactory all round. If the convicts are mostly Lutherans and
Catholics, what right have the Methodists or the Baptists, or the
Presbyterians to complain that a Catholic or a Lutheran is chap-
lain ? If those complaining sects can prove that they are more
largely represented in the penitentiary than the Catholics or the
Lutherans, that is another matter. The church that contributes
the largest number of convicts ought to have the chaplain.
*
* *
A storm of sleet and wind and snow blighted the coronation
pageantry at Washington on the 4th of March, and threw a chill
over the festival. This was ominous, and dismally pathetic of a
political "cold wave," more bitter than wind or snow, a chilling
frost blighting the promised harvest of a patriotic multitude,
camped around the capitol and clamoring for the ofBces earned by
political toil. I can hardly believe it, and yet the papers tell it,
that Mr. Cleveland "has definitely decided and has authorised
his cabinet to announce to applicants for appointments, that all
officials now in office, against whom no charges are made, will be
permitted to hold until their commissions expire." It is also esti-
mated that the enthusiastic legions who cheered the President on
his triumphal march have paid $2,500,000 to the hotel-keepers of
Washington, and where is the compensation for this ruinous
" drain of gold "? How are the cohorts to get their money back,
unless they get the offices won by their valor in the late campaign?
" Put not your trust in princes," is a Scripture warning, to which
might well be added, " nor in presidents." They remember not
their friends. The Democratic transparencies, banners, and badges
flaunted in the late campaign are now mute symbols of a barren
victory. The bugles that inspired the hosts are silent, and the re-
turning braves chant mournfully the " Hymn to Ingratitude," from
Shakespeare
:
" Freeze, freeze, thou bitter sky.
That dost not bite so nigh
As benefits forgot.
Though thou the waters warp.
Thy sting is not so sharp
As friend remembered not."
* *
That is the dirge of the disappointed, and I am not surprised
to read in the dispatches from Washington, dated March 8th, that
"if they had suspected such a situation last summer they would
not have attended the Chicago convention in such numbers and
whooped it up so violently in the campaign." Certainly not ; and
the pathetic story reminds me of something equally sad that oc-
curred in my own experience. In the summer of 1861, the regi-
ment in which I served was on the march in Missouri, and one
evening we went into bivouac in the woods near a little town
called Shelbyville, where we were tantalised and exasperated by a
building that bore on its arrogant front the opulent word "bank."
About midnight a party of the soldiers stole quietly out of camp,
entered the bank, loaded the safe on to a wagon, and carried it
into the woods, where they might open it without making too much
noise. They worked all night at the safe without success, but
about daylight, by the aid of axes and gunpowder, they broke it
open, and all the reward they got for their honest toil was a few
papers "of no use to anybody but the owner." The outrage being
discovered, our Colonel ordered an investigation, but the maraud-
ers were not found, and after breakfast we resumed our journey.
We had hardly gone ten miles before I noticed three or four of my
men dozing on the march, and at last, one of them towards the
front of the column, addressing a sleepy comrade a few files back
of him, said : " Tom ! What good is a bank that has no money in
it ?" With similar disgust the Democratic soldiers who "whooped
it up so violently in the late campaign," are now saying to one
another: "Tom! What good is a victory that has no offices in it ? "
And the pathos in the question moves the very stones to "rise and
mutiny."
* *
For the past two or three weeks my conscience has been dis-
turbed because of a charge brought against me by a respectable
body of citizens called "The Tailors' National Exchange." This
confederation, at a session held in Milwaukee last month, " pre-
sented a report," in which it was charged that 100,000 American
tourists go abroad every year, each bringing back on an average
two suits of clothes, "thus entailing a loss upon American tailors
of between $3,000,000 and S5,ooo,ooo." As every guilty man,
whenever a crime is mentioned, thinks himself accused, so the
statistics given by those tailors read like a special indictment
against me. I feel as the smitten David felt when accused in a
parable by the prophet, because a few years ago I actually was an
"American tourist." I wandered away to Europe, and I wickedly
did bring back with me two suits of clothes that I bought in Lon-
don. Avarice tempted me, for I got the two suits for the precise
amount of money that I should have been compelled to pay for
one suit in my own country. There is a moral puzzle in the case,
and the ethical problem arising from the facts is this ; in buying
two suits for the price of one, did I cheat the tailors ; or do they
cheat me when they compel me to pay two prices for one suit ? I
think the answer will be against them, because they demand and
receive the assistance of a law, that enables them to do so. The
only remedy for the tailors is the passage of another law prevent-
ing Americans from going abroad at all. This is easy and simple,
like the plan of the Nebraska statesman who has introduced a bill
into the legislature of that state, forbidding the use of gas for
illuminating purposes, because, as he logically says, when gas is
abolished fools will not be able to blow it out, and thus endanger
their lives. If Americans are not allowed to go to Europe, of
course they will not buy any clothes there ; they will be eSectually
restrained from " thus entailing a loss upon American tailors."
M. M. Trumbull.
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